Anger and disgust shape judgments of social sanctions across cultures, especially in high individual autonomy societies.

When someone violates a social norm, others may think that some sanction would be appropriate. We examine how the experience of emotions like anger and disgust relate to the judged appropriateness of sanctions, in a pre-registered analysis of data from a large-scale study in 56 societies. Across the world, we find that individuals who experience anger and disgust over a norm violation are more likely to endorse confrontation, ostracism and, to a smaller extent, gossip. Moreover, we find that the experience of anger is consistently the strongest predictor of judgments of confrontation, compared to other emotions. Although the link between state-based emotions and judgments may seem universal, its strength varies across countries. Aligned with theoretical predictions, this link is stronger in societies, and among individuals, that place higher value on individual autonomy. Thus, autonomy values may increase the role that emotions play in guiding judgments of social sanctions.

Appropriateness ratings of everyday behaviors in the United States now and 50 years ago.

Introduction: A crucial aspect of social norms pertains to determining which behaviors are considered appropriate. Here we consider everyday behaviors. Some everyday behaviors are rated as more appropriate than others, and ratings of the appropriateness of a given behavior may vary over time. The objective of this study is to elucidate the reasons behind variation in appropriateness ratings of everyday behaviors in the United States. Our theory focuses on how the evaluation of the appropriateness of a behavior is influenced by its potential for externalities and internalities, and how this influence may cause a change in norms over time. Method: Employing a preregistered design, we asked American participants to rate 37 different everyday behaviors based on their appropriateness in a range of common situations, as well as their potential negative externalities (e.g., being loud, being aggressive, taking up space) and positive internalities (e.g., pleasurability). Changes over time were calculated as the difference between mean ratings obtained in this study and ratings of the same behavior in a similar study conducted 50 years ago. Results: As expected, overall appropriateness ratings of everyday behaviors are associated both with their externalities and their internalities, so that the least appropriate behaviors tend to have considerable potential for negative externalities and little potential for positive internalities. Moreover, behaviors that have considerable potential for negative externalities are perceived as less appropriate now than 50 years ago. Discussion: By describing how social norms for everyday behaviors depend on the externalities and internalities of behaviors, this study contributes to theories about the emergence and change of social norms.

Cognitive ability and ideology join forces in the culture war: A model of opinion formation.

We propose a model of moral policy opinion formation that integrates both ideology and cognitive ability. The link from people's ideology to their opinions is assumed to go via a semantic processing of moral arguments that relies on the individual's cognitive ability. An implication of this model is that the relative quality of arguments that justify supporting vs. opposing a moral policy-the policy's "argument advantage"-is key to how opinions will be distributed in the population and develop over time. To test this implication, we combine polling data with measures of the argument advantage for 35 moral policies. Consistent with the opinion formation model, the argument advantage of a moral policy accounts for how public opinion moves over time, and how support for the policy ideologies varies across different ideological groups and levels of cognitive ability, including a strong interaction between ideology and cognitive ability.

The social values of newly arrived immigrants in Sweden.

Concerns have been raised that immigrants coming to Europe bring fundamentally different social values, affecting the more liberal receiving societies negatively. However, the topic of immigrants' social values is understudied, and much research studies only one issue at a time, lacking a systematic approach to compare immigrants and native-born across issues. We study the social values of immigrants in Sweden using a large sample of newly arrived immigrants and their opinions on 35 different moral issues. Our results indicate a large heterogeneity across different issues, with, on average, a general tendency towards liberal social values among immigrants. We find that individual characteristics are more important than characteristics of the country of origin in explaining variation of social values between immigrants. Religiosity has the largest effect, with more religious individuals having more conservative stances. Using external data sources, we compare immigrants with native-born regarding both average positions on different issues, and the correlation between issue positions. Compared with the native-born, immigrants have, on average, somewhat more conservative values, but the underlying values structure is the same.

How does political discussion frequency impact political moral opinions? The moral argument theory of opinion dynamics.

Discussions of political issues may influence people's opinions. Is there any systematic difference in opinions between those who discuss frequently and those who do not? We measured the association between self-reported discussion frequency and the probability of holding the more liberal opinion on moral issues, using data from the General Social Survey (81 issues, n = 4,395) and the American National Election Studies (27 issues, n = 17,653). This association looked different among liberals and among conservatives. Having more frequent discussions is associated with a higher probability of holding more liberal opinions among liberals, while there is little association between discussion frequency and opinions among conservatives. These findings can be explained by the moral argument theory, which is an account of the long-term liberalization of public opinion on moral issues as an outcome of repeated discussions. The key assumption of this theory is that opinions that are justified by the kinds of arguments that only conservatives accept have a disadvantage compared to opinions that are justified by the kinds of arguments that everyone accepts. Consistent with this theory, we find that the effect of discussion frequency is stronger for moral opinions that have a bigger argument advantage.

The Liberal Social Values of Swedish Healthcare Providers in Women's Healthcare: Implications for Clinical Encounters in a Diversified Sexual and Reproductive Healthcare.

Objectives: Women's healthcare is a potential source of cross-cultural conflicts. Diverging values between healthcare providers and patients challenges the provision of culturally sensitive care and meeting migrant women's needs. The aim is to investigate healthcare providers' values in relation to sexual and reproductive rights, gender equality, migration and religion in Swedish sexual and reproductive healthcare. Methods: A national cross-sectional study was carried out. The questionnaire was distributed through a non-probability sample to midwives or other nurses, gynaecologists and obstetricians, and hospital social workers (n = 1,041). Through descriptive statistics, we mapped their values, comparing healthcare provider data to external representative population survey data. Results: Healthcare providers in sexual and reproductive healthcare displayed homogeneous liberal social values, being permissive towards sexual and reproductive rights and restrictive against gender-based violence. They were for gender equality, expressed low anti-immigrant sentiments, and had even more liberal values than the Swedish population and a demographically comparative sub-population. Conclusion: Individuals with very liberal values are selected to work in Swedish sexual and reproductive healthcare. Healthcare providers need self-reflexivity to avoid conflicts in clinical encounters in a diversified society.

Predicting how US public opinion on moral issues will change from 2018 to 2020 and beyond.

The General Social Survey, conducted every 2 years, measures public opinion on a wide range of moral issues. The data from the 2020 survey are expected to be released in mid-October 2021. In advance of this data release, we make predictions for how public opinion will have shifted since 2018. We also predict further public opinion shifts for the coming decade up until the year 2030. These predictions are based on the theory that an opinion will become more popular over time if it holds an argument advantage, that is, if it is better justified by generally accepted kinds of arguments than the opposite opinion is. While this theory has successfully accounted for historical opinion trends, this is the first time it is used to predict future shifts. To assess the accuracy of our forecast we will compare it with the benchmark forecast that predicts the same public opinion in 2020 as in 2018.

Vaccine confidence is higher in more religious countries.

Vaccine hesitancy is a threat to global health, but it is not ubiquitous; depending on the country, the proportion that have confidence in vaccines ranges from a small minority to a huge majority. Little is known about what explains this dramatic variation in vaccine confidence. We hypothesize that variation in religiosity may play a role because traditional religious teachings are likely to be incompatible with the specific magical/spiritual health beliefs that often undergird anti-vaccination sentiments. In analyses of publicly available data in 147 countries, we find that a country measure of religiosity is strongly positively correlated with country measures of confidence in the safety, importance, and effectiveness of vaccines, and these associations are robust to controlling for measures of human development (education, economic development, and health). The underlying mechanism needs to be examined in future research.

The Power of Tolerance vs. Unselfishness as a Cultural Determinant of Cooperation.

Cooperation in collective action problems and resource dilemmas is often assumed to depend on the values of the individuals involved, such as their degree of unselfishness and tolerance. Societal differences in cooperation and cooperative norms may therefore result from cultural variation in emphasis on these personal values. Here we draw on several cross-national datasets to examine whether society-level emphasis on unselfishness and tolerance and respect for other people predict how societies vary in cooperation [in a continuous prisoner's dilemma (PD)] and in norms governing cooperation [in a common pool resource dilemma (CPR)]. The results suggest that high levels of cooperation and cooperative norms are promoted specifically by a cultural emphasis on tolerance.

The Advent of the COVID-19 Epidemic Did Not Affect Americans' Endorsement of Moral Foundations.

Prior work has suggested that existential threats in the form of terror attacks may shift liberals' reliance on moral foundations to more resemble those of conservatives. We therefore hypothesized that endorsement of these moral foundations would have increased when the COVID-19 epidemic became a salient threat. To examine this hypothesis we conducted a longitudinal study with 237 American participants across the liberal-conservative spectrum, in which their endorsement of various moral foundations were measured before and after the advent of the pandemic. We did not find evidence of any systematic change in the endorsement of any moral foundation, neither in general nor specifically among liberals or specifically among those who perceived the greatest threat from COVID-19. We conclude that the threat from the pandemic does not seem to have had any substantial effect on the moral foundations that people rely on. We discuss how this finding relates to other longitudinal studies of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on measures related to conservatism.

Different Populations Agree on Which Moral Arguments Underlie Which Opinions.

People often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., "It is unfair if homosexuals are not allowed to marry!" vs. "Letting homosexuals marry is against our traditions!"). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.

The Relation Between Gender Egalitarian Values and Gender Differences in Academic Achievement.

Gender differences in achievement exhibit variation between domains and between countries. Much prior research has examined whether this variation could be due to variation in gender equality in opportunities, with mixed results. Here we focus instead on the role of a society's values about gender equality, which may have a more pervasive influence. We pooled all available country measures on adolescent boys' and girls' academic achievement between 2000 and 2015 from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) assessments of math, science, and reading. We then analyzed the relation between gender differences and country levels of gender egalitarian values, controlling for country levels of living standards and indicators of gender equality in opportunities. Gender egalitarian values came out as the most important predictor. Specifically, more gender egalitarian values were associated with improved performance of boys relative to girls in the same countries. This pattern held in reading, where boys globally perform substantially worse than girls, as well as in math and science where gender differences in performance are small and may favor either boys or girls. Our findings suggest a previously underappreciated role of cultural values in moderating gender gaps in academic achievement.

Generosity pays: Selfish people have fewer children and earn less money.

Does selfishness pay in the long term? Previous research has indicated that being prosocial (or otherish) rather than selfish has positive consequences for psychological well-being, physical health, and relationships. Here we instead examine the consequences for individuals' incomes and number of children, as these are the currencies that matter most in theories that emphasize the power of self-interest, namely economics and evolutionary thinking. Drawing on both cross-sectional (Studies 1 and 2) and panel data (Studies 3 and 4), we find that prosocial individuals tend to have more children and higher income than selfish individuals. An additional survey (Study 5) of lay beliefs about how self-interest impacts income and fertility suggests one reason selfish people may persist in their behavior even though it leads to poorer outcomes: people generally expect selfish individuals to have higher incomes. Our findings have implications for lay decisions about the allocation of scarce resources, as well as for economic and evolutionary theories of human behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The connection between moral positions and moral arguments drives opinion change.

Liberals and conservatives often take opposing positions on moral issues. But what makes a moral position liberal or conservative? Why does public opinion tend to become more liberal over time? And why does public opinion change especially fast on certain issues, such as gay rights? We offer an explanation based on how different positions connect with different kinds of moral arguments. Based on a formal model of opinion dynamics, we predicted that positions better connected to harm and fairness arguments will be more popular among liberals and will become more popular over time among liberals and conservatives. Finally, the speed of this trend will be faster the better the position connects to harm and fairness arguments. These predictions all held with high accuracy in 44 years of polling on moral opinions. The model explains the connection between ideology and moral opinions, and generates precise predictions for future opinion change.

Ethnic variations in mental health among 10-15-year-olds living in England and Wales: The impact of neighbourhood characteristics and parental behaviour.

Several studies indicate that young people from certain ethnic minority groups in Britain have significant mental health advantages over their White majority counterparts, but the reasons for these differences have not been adequately explored. This work analyses the impact of neighbourhood characteristics, measured by socioeconomic deprivation; crime; living conditions; ethnic density and parenting behaviour on the mental health of young people. To determine the impact of these factors on mental health among young people, geocoded data from waves 1, 3 and 5 of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) are merged with small area statistics from the 2011 census, and multilevel linear regression models are fitted to the sample of 5513 (7302 observations) 10-15-year-olds of varying ethnicity residing in England and Wales. We find that mental health is generally poorer for White British youths, even after accounting for individual/family-level predictors, neighbourhood characteristics and parental behaviour than it is for minority youths. In keeping with results from studies of adult populations, neighbourhoods with high levels of deprivation are associated with poorer mental health. However, some aspects of parenting behaviour appear to have a more significant impact on the mental health of young people from ethnic minority backgrounds than on White British youths. Further research into factors that influence inter-ethnic disparities in mental health among young people is warranted, given that clear differences remain after the models in this study are fully adjusted.